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Usage of health facilities in Ethiopia is among the lowest in the world; raising usage rates is 
probably critical for improving health outcomes. The government has diagnosed the principal 
problem as the lack of primary health facilities and is devoting a large share of the health budget to 
building more facilities. But household data suggest that usage of health facilities is sensitive not 
just to the distance to the nearest facility but also to the quality of health care provided. If the 
quality of weak facilities were raised to the quality currently provided by the majority of facilities in 
Ethiopia, usage would rise significantly.  National data suggest that, given the current density and 
quality of service provision, additional expenditure on improving the quality of service delivery will 
be more cost effective than increasing the density of service provision. The budget allocation rule 
presented in the article can help local policymakers make decisions about how to allocate funds 
between improving the quality of care and decreasing the distance to the nearest health care facility. 
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This article combines household survey data on health care choices in rural Ethiopia with budget 
data on the costs of health provision to analyze the tradeoff between the density of service 
provision and its quality. It develops a budget allocation rule that can be used in local 
decisionmaking. National data suggest that, given the current density and quality of service 
provision, additional expenditure on improving the quality of service delivery will usually be 
more cost effective than increasing the density of service provision.  
The focus is on the usage of health services rather than health outcomes.
1 The link from 
usage onto outcomes is complex. For example, Ethiopian health care providers use the 
opportunity provided by curative visits to provide preventative treatment, so that the impact of 
health care on the illness that motivates the visit is likely to underestimate the overall 
contribution of usage to health.  
In Ethiopia usage is much lower than in most other low-income countries. In 1996 only 9 
percent of the population reported visiting a modern health facility during the past two months 
(Dercon 2000). This compares with 14 percent in Kenya, also based on a two-month recall 
period (Appleton 1998); 13 percent in Ghana, based on a four-week recall period; and 15 percent 
in C￿te d￿Ivoire, based on a four-week recall period (Lavy and Germain 1994; Dor and Van der 
Gaag1988). These differences exist despite far worse health outcomes in Ethiopia.
2 Among those 
who sought treatment, the vast majority relied on public facilities￿not surprising in a country in 
which in 1999 more than 90 percent of rural health clinics (centers and stations) were owned by 
the government (Ministry of Health 1999). This reliance on public facilities distinguishes 
 
  2Ethiopia from other Sub-Saharan countries: In C￿te d￿Ivoire, for example, only about 40 percent 
of households relied on public facilities; in Kenya only about a third did so. Thus there is a 
reasonable presumption that poor health outcomes are in part caused by the atypically low usage 
of health facilities and that policy toward public provision will continue to be important in 
rectifying it.
3 
Policy to increase usage in Ethiopia currently focuses on increasing the physical coverage 
of facilities. This approach is based on the belief that distance is the main disincentive to using 
services. Increased coverage is very costly in terms of both the capital costs of building facilities 
and the fixed recurrent costs of running them. The policy thus squeezes variable recurrent 
expenditure per facility, reducing staffing and the supply of material inputs, such as drugs, and 
worsening the quality of service provision. In a highly revenue-constrained environment, there is 
a sharp tradeoff between reducing the distance to health facilities and improving their quality.  
To the extent that existing facilities have spare capacity, increasing the quality of services 
may increase usage. A dollar spent on increasing the quality of service provision may increase 
usage by more than a dollar spent on increasing the number of facilities. In this case, aside from 
considerations of equity, improving quality dominates building new facilities, since there is a 
larger increase in usage and both existing and new users get better services. Only if the reverse 
holds (so that services for new users are at the expense of services for existing users), is there a 
quantity-quality tradeoff. 
The responsiveness of health care demand to the distance from facilities is well 




 been largely ignored. Recent work has pointed to the importance of including quality variables 
(see, for example, Lavy and Germain 1994; Litvack and Bodart 1993; Akin, Guilkey, and 
Denton 1995; Akin and others 1986; Hotchkiss 1993; Lavy, Strauss, and De Vreyer 1996; 
Mwabu, Ainsworth, and Nyamete 1993; and Thomas, Lavy, and Strauss 1996 . For an overview 
see Alderman and Lavy 1996.). Distance and quality are now recognized to be jointly important 
in determining usage.  
This article applies similar techniques in Ethiopia. The distance-quality tradeoff has not 
previously been studied in such a deprived environment. The article further innovates by relating 
household behavior to budgetary expenses. To date the main policy focus of research on the 
demand effects of health care quality has been on user fees: If fees raise quality sufficiently they 
can enhance usage. This article is concerned with the budgetary choice between government 
expenditures on capital programs versus recurrent health expenditures. That is, it takes total 
health care financing as given. Clearly, in the distance-quality tradeoff the main choice is one of 
budget allocation rather than cost recovery. By focusing on the distance-quality tradeoff, we do 
not mean to imply that this is necessarily the most important issue in the allocation of public 
expenditure on health care. However, it has been neglected, since it is less obvious than tradeoffs 
such as clinics versus hospitals. 
Section I formalizes the determination of demand by density and quality and discusses 
the relation between demand and welfare. Section II describes health provision in Ethiopia. 
Section III presents regression results on the demand for health care, comparing the effects of the 
quantity and quality of the provision of clinics on the quantity of health service usage. Section 
IV estimates budgetary costs of increased quantity of provision and improved quality of services 
and derives the relative cost effectiveness of capital and recurrent expenditures. Section V 
  4summarizes the article￿s main finding.  
I. A FORMAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF QUALITY AND DISTANCE ON 
USAGE OF HEALTH CARE 
The government is assumed to want to maximize health outcomes subject to a budget constraint 
and the behavior of the representative household. The instruments the government has are the 
quality and the density of the primary health care network. This is a principal-agent problem in 
which the government needs to take into account the effects of its instruments on household 
demand for health care. Households are assumed to be characterized by a utility function in 
which health is an argument. This is the simplest way to represent the value placed by 
households on health in a static framework:
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where H is a measure of health and C is consumption excluding health. Time may be spent either 
in providing labor or in visiting health facilities: 
(2)      V ). D ( t l L + =
where L is the endowment of time, l is labor, D is the distance from facilities, t is the time spent 
per visit to a clinic, and V is the household￿s demand for visits to health facilities. We could 
simply assume that time is a linear function of distance; doing so, however, ignores the 
possibility that people substitute into faster forms of transport as distance increases. In this 
article we use data on distance rather than time, and the form of the function is not important. 
The full income budget constraint is given by 
(3)       V ). D ( t . w V . F C L . w + + =
  5where w is the real wage rate and F is the user charge for health care. 
The amount of health actually achieved is determined by a production function in which 
both demand and the quality of facilities play a part: 
(4)      ) Q , V , C ( H H =
where Q is quality.   
For simplicity these functions are treated as deterministic; the stochastic nature of health 
outcomes is important in many contexts but does not affect this model. 
The household chooses L and V to maximize equation 1 subject to equations 2￿4. This 
problem yields demand functions both for health and for health care:  
(5)     ) w , F , Q , D ( h H =
(6)     ) w , F , Q , D ( V V =
Our concern is with the demand functions, in particular the partial derivatives of the 
demand function for health care with respect to distance and quality. Empirical work has shed 
light on other derivatives of the demand function. Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) use the 
effects of distance on usage to estimate the effects of price on usage; Mwabu, Ainsworth, and 
Nyamete (1993) use the effects of seasonal movements in the cost of time to isolate the 
substitution effects of increases in the cost of time, finding that people visit clinics less in the 
busy season. Quality effects have been researched by Lavy and Germain (1994); Thomas, Lavy, 
and Strauss (1996) ; and Lavy and others (1996). Although changes in usage do not directly tell 
us about the change in welfare, they do have implications about the effectiveness of medical 
care. Since usage of health care has an opportunity cost in terms of consumption, we can 
distinguish between an income effect and a pure substitution effect in the choice between health 
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in health outcomes. As long as health is a normal good, both the income and substitution effects 
work to increase the consumption of health outcomes and hence of usage. By contrast, an 
improvement in quality does not reduce the cost of usage but rather its effectiveness. Hence 
fewer visits will be needed to maintain a given health outcome. Improved quality thus directly 
lowers the price of health outcomes. Although there will be both an income and a substitution 
effect increasing the consumption of health outcomes, this need not imply increased usage of 
health services. Increased usage of health services would require reduced consumption of other 
goods and so will come about only if the substitution effect into improved health is sufficiently 
strong to outweigh the income effect, which tends to increase consumption of other goods and so 
reduce visits. 
This can be seen in a simplified example of the model. Let the health production function 
(equation 4) take the form: 
(7)      Q . V H =
so that we abstract from any effect of consumption onto health. Let the opportunity cost of visits 
in terms of consumption take the form: 
(8) 
       V D L w C . . − =
so that we abstract from user chargers and make the cost of distance linear in distance. Finally, 
let the utility function take the form: 
(9)     C . H U =
The optimal number of health care visits is now: 
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The demand for visits is thus invariant with respect to quality, while being a decreasing 
function of distance. In this case the income and substitution effects of a change in quality 
precisely net out. This is not a general result but depends on the functional form of the health 
production function and the utility function. For example, if the health production function takes 
the form: 
(11)        Q V H =
then the optimal number of health care visits becomes: 
(12)  
D ). Q 1 (
L . w . Q
V*
+
=   
so that the derivative with respect to quality becomes strictly positive, while the derivative with 
respect to distance remains strictly decreasing. (Note that the quality index developed below is 
bounded by 0 and 1, so that equation 11 is concave in visits). 
Given the objective of maximizing health outcomes, the government￿s allocation of 
spending between recurrent and capital spending must be such as to generate a level of quality 
and a density of provision that maximize health outcomes for given overall expenditures.
5 
Formally, 
(13)     D . c Q . r G − =
where G is the government health budget, r is the unit price of an improvement in quality, and c 
is the unit price of a reduction in the distance to the health facility. 
The government maximizes H subject to its budget constraint (equation 13) and the 
 
  8demand functions for health and health care (equations 5 and 6). It must equalize the marginal 
effects of its expenditures on quality and density on the health outcome of the representative 
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In general, expenditure on quality affects health outcomes through two routes, a direct 
increase in the efficacy of a given level of usage and an indirect change in the amount of usage, 
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In the empirical application in Section III we are not observing health outcomes but the 
differential impact of quality and density on usage. We can nevertheless test the efficiency of 
allocation of health care expenditures by testing whether they meet the condition set out in expression 17. That is, since improving quality raises health outcomes both through an efficacy 
effect and a usage effect whereas reducing distance works only through a usage effect, efficient 
allocation will require that the marginal impact on usage of a unit of expenditure on improved 
quality should be less than the marginal impact of a unit of expenditure on increased density.  
Finally, we introduce a complication that reflects the dual nature of health care provision 
in Ethiopia between the public and private sectors: Both sectors maintain rural facilities, even if 
90 percent of the modern facilities are public. The government can directly improve quality and 
reduce distance only with respect to its own facilities. The government decision problem remains 
as characterized above, conditional on the demand for health and health care by private agents, 
though with V redefined as total usage. However, there is an additional substitution effect from 
the usage of private facilities. How such a substitution is valued by the government depends on 
the efficacy of private provision. If private facilities are of lower quality than public facilities, 
condition 17 is unaffected. If private facilities are of better quality than public facilities, an 
increase in overall usage would be the net effect of a reduction in the usage of good facilities 
more than offset by an increase in the usage of poor facilities. Such a change in usage could even 
reduce overall health states, so that dH/dV could potentially be negative. This would reverse the 
inequality in 17 as a condition for allocative efficiency but reinforce its core result. Since the 
effect of increased overall usage, V, on health outcomes would now be negative, the government 
would need to reduce its expenditure on distance reduction. Indeed, expenditure on distance 
reduction should be reduced until dH/dV becomes positive, at which point condition 17 would 
again apply. Expenditure on distance reduction greater than that implied by 17 is always 
excessive. 
  10II. HEALTH CARE PROVISION IN ETHIOPIA 
Between 1987 and 1996 annual per capita government spending on health facilities averaged just 
$1.40 in constant 1987 U.S. dollars￿far below the African average and indeed among the lowest 
in the world (World Bank 1996).  Given these low levels of expenditure it is not surprising that 
provision is inadequate in terms of both density and quality. Facilities are thinly and unevenly 
spread, so that many households are far from clinics. Recent national sample data suggest that 
about 40 percent of rural households live more than 10 kilometers from the nearest health facility 
(Central Statistical Authority 1999). 
  The services provided are often deficient. Clinics lack drugs and basic equipment. A 
government survey of facilities found that most lacked more than a quarter of the drugs rated as 
essential and a quarter lacked a refrigerator in which to store them.
6 These indicators appear 
worse than in other African countries. In Nigeria only about 28 percent of public health facilities 
lack drugs (Akin and others 1995); in Ghana about a third of public health facilities lack drugs 
(Lavy and Germain 1994). In Kenya public facilities lack antibiotics on average for about a tenth 
of the year (Mwabu, Ainsworth, and Nyamete1993).
7  
The budgetary choice between the quantity of facilities and the quality of service 
provided is complicated in Ethiopia by two institutional features. First, the quantity of facilities, 
determined by the capital budget, is controlled by the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Development, whereas the quality of services, determined by the recurrent budget, is controlled 
by the Ministry of Finance. The choice is liable to be more severely politicized than it would be 
if a single ministry were responsible for both types of expenditures. Second, most donors are 
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 precluded from funding recurrent expenditure and so, except through fungibility, increased 
donor funding is liable to shift the balance of expenditures toward facility provision rather than 
service quality. The tradeoff is intensified because capital expenditure not only has an 
opportunity cost in terms of contemporaneous recurrent expenditure but alters the subsequent 
composition of recurrent expenditure. Facilities have to be staffed, putting pressure on nonsalary 
recurrent expenditures.  
The empirical analysis is based on a rural household survey conducted between 1994 and 
1997 (see Dercon and Krishnan 1998 for details). Data are available from several rounds 
covering a panel of about 1,450 households and about 9,000 individuals. Detailed information on 
quality is available only for the first survey period (1994/95), except for a more limited number 
of villages (and therefore smaller sample), in which the health facilities were resurveyed just 
before the 1997 data collection round. We use mainly the data for the earlier period but then use 
the smaller sample from 1997 to run fixed effects regressions, with varying quality, providing us 
with estimates for the quality effects, controlling for unobserved factors, such as fixed program 
placement effects.  
The sampling frame was based on the major agro-ecological zones, focusing on the 
cereal-plough zones in Northern, Central, and Southern Ethiopia; the enset complex; and the 
grain-hoe complex. Pastoralists and smaller zones were not included in this study. The sampled 
households cover 15 villages, in an attempt to capture the different circumstances within 
different parts of each of the zones. The actual number of households chosen in each village 
reflects the population proportions. The relatively small number of villages was inspired by the 
practical constraints and costs of constructing high-quality longitudinal data and the desire to 
allow more detailed collection of community-level data. Attrition rates between 1994 and 1997 
  12were about 5 percent. The sites chosen are very diverse in terms of wealth, agricultural 
resources, infrastructure, service provision, and so forth. The resulting sample can be considered 
broadly representative of the population in these agro-ecological zones, covering more than 80 
percent of the rural population, although care has to be taken in interpreting the results. The 
sample is more suited for understanding causal relations across different types of households and 
the evolution over time of indicators than the actual levels of, say, the regional distribution of 
disease or malnutrition.  
The survey collected comprehensive data on health and a large number of individual, 
household and community characteristics. The health data were self-reported and covered 
incidence and duration of illness, symptoms, and actions taken. The recall period was the 
preceding four weeks. On average about 10 percent of the population reported an illness episode 
and 52 percent sought treatment (table 1).
8  
Richer households are only slightly more likely to consult someone for treatment (50 per 
cent for the richest quartile versus 44 percent for the poorest group). The poor rely 
disproportionately on pharmacies and the nearest clinics, whereas richer households rely on 
hospitals and more distant facilities.
9 
Hospitals, pharmacies, and clinics in Ethiopia can be owned by private agents, the 
government, or NGOs. In the survey, households were asked to specify whether the facility 
visited was a government facility, a private (and modern) or NGO facility, or a traditional site. In 
many areas private hospitals or clinics may be at a considerable distance, so there may be no 
effective choice as to whether public or private facilities are used. The state sector still strongly 
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 dominates health provision. About 75 per cent of hospitals and 90 percent of health stations and 
centers belong to the government. More than 90 per cent of pharmacies are private, however. In 
our sample the nearest health centers and clinics are almost always public. Hence the choice as 
to public or private facility is largely subsumed in the choice between pharmacies and other 
facilities.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of visits to private and public facilities.
10 More than 60 
percent of the visits are to government facilities.
11 The apparent lack of difference across 
consumption quartiles conceals the fact that for the poorest group, pharmacies (the lowest tier of 
primary health care) are by far the most important source of private treatment, while for the 
richer groups, private health care includes a high proportion of visits by health workers at home 
or visits to private health clinics and centers.  
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We use (reduced-form) demand relations for health care usage, distinguishing between distance 
to the facility, household and individual characteristics, and the quality of care, as in equation 6. 
People in different communities face differences in location and quality, even though the prices 
charged by clinics are uniform, some services, such as immunization, being free, and some 
having a low price (such as a 0.50 birr registration fee). Distances to health facilities are used to 
proxy the opportunity costs of getting to these services. Health stations or centers, the most 
important primary health care focal point in the health care system, are on average about 7 





 We include as explanatory variables a set of individual and household characteristics. 
Household income is proxied by household expenditure. We also control for the age and sex of 
the individual, as well as the age and sex of the household head and whether the mother 
completed primary school. Mean household expenditure in the sample is close to about $120 per 
capita per year (63 birr per capita per month in 1994 prices). The education variable shows the 
extremely low levels of schooling in rural Ethiopia, with only 2 percent of mothers having 
completed primary schooling. 
In addition to these standard explanatory variables, we introduce information related to 
the quality of health care provided in the health facilities available to the households in the 
sample. Measuring quality in health facilities is always difficult (Alderman and Lavy 1996; 
Thomas, Lavy, and Strauss 1996 ; Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 1997). As in most other 
contributions to this literature, we focus on attributes that are necessary for the quality of care to 
be adequate rather than on quality differences above such a threshold. To provide adequate 
quality of service, a clinic requires functioning equipment, qualified staff, and a reliable supply 
of material inputs, such as dressings and drugs. We proxy each of these three attributes. The 
proxy for functioning equipment is whether the clinic has a functioning refrigerator with a back-
up supply of power. Two-thirds of public clinics had such a refrigerator. The proxy for the 
quality of staff is whether the clinic has a qualified nurse in regular attendance. In 1994 about 
two-thirds of the sample of government facilities had a nurse in regular attendance. The proxy 
for material inputs is whether the clinic reports receiving a regular supply of antibiotics. The 
current system for distributing drugs to primary facilities is indeed likely to produce large quality 
differences. Government- and donor-financed drugs pass through distinct and uncoordinated 
systems, neither of which is responsive to needs. Primary (public) facilities do not purchase 
  15drugs from distribution systems but rather receive such drugs as they are assigned. The lack of 
responsiveness of drug supply to need results in both persistent shortages and the persistent 
supply of drugs to locations where they are useless. Hence unsatisfactory quality is most likely 
the result of random failures in planned allocations (see Government of Ethiopia 1997). Only 
half the public clinics in the sample had a regular supply of antibiotics in 1994.
13  
There is wide variety in quality across facilities (table 3). Private health centers 
(including those run by NGOs) generally have better quality, but there are few of them, so that in 
many villages the nearest (and relevant) private facility is a private drug vendor, with very low 
quality. Only about a third of government facilities satisfy all the minimum quality criteria 
investigated.  
Data on both facility characteristics and household characteristics were collected in 1994 
from 15 villages. The reference period for facilities was for what was ￿typical￿ over the 
preceding 12 months. The households were surveyed three times during this reference period. 
The pooled data set for these three rounds was then used in the regressions (allowing for the 
intertemporal dependence of errors using a random effects model). In 1997 both the facility and 
the household surveys were repeated in four villages. Since for this subsample we have data on 
changes in quality, we are able to test the robustness of the apparent effects of quality found in 
the cross-section analysis. In particular, by running fixed effects regressions, we can control for 
unobserved individual and community characteristics that may be correlated with health care 
quality (and other variables in the regression). If fixed program placement effects (such as the 
quality of health care being better in intrinsically wealthier areas populated with individuals with 
better health endowments) are present, the coefficients on quality variables in cross-section data 
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 are biased (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986 for a classic discussion). Fixed effects regressions 
control for these fixed program placement effects, solving this problem. Since the coefficients 
are crucial for the analysis, the fact that we can do this is important, even though the subsample 
is relatively small. Although the potential for bias is well understood, such robustness tests are 
very rare because of lack of data. Note that neither the quality of private facilities nor the 
distance to health facilities changed in the subsample between 1994 and 1997 (no new building 
took place), so that the robustness of the results can be checked only with respect to the effect of 
the quality of public facilities. 
Several different models are estimated to explain usage of modern health care services 
when ill. We use a set of individual and household characteristics, distance to and quality of the 
nearest private and public health facility, and a dummy, which is one when the nearest public 
facility is a pharmacy. This control is introduced since we are interested in allocations in the 
health budget, which does not consider pharmacies as primary health care facilities, even though 
households appear to be using them as such.
14 The first two models we estimate are simple probit 
models explaining usage among people who are ill, as well as the probit random effects model. 
The probit random effects model controls for constant individual-specific effects that are 
randomly distributed across the population, effectively allowing for serial dependence of errors 
across the same individuals in the panel.  
We experimented by entering the three measures of quality in the usage regression both 
individually and as a composite. The composite is convenient, since we can use it in later 
calculations of the cost of providing clinics of satisfactory quality relative to the benefits of 
increased usage. In building the composite we score the three attributes, using the information in 
  17table 3. The equal weighting is arbitrary. However, when each of the three components was 
entered separately, the results were not substantially affected.
15  
The empirical model used is a binary choice model focusing on whether treatment is 
sought or not. This choice needs justification. It is more usual to run a multinominal or nested 
multinominal logit model to explain the choices between different types of facilities (as in Lavy 
and Germain 1994 or Gertler and van der Gaag 1990), thereby revealing the substitution effects 
between different facilities. However, our focus is on how total usage of modern health care is 
affected. We seek to quantify the net effect of changes in the quality of and distance to the 
primary public facilities of health care on total usage (including clinics, pharmacies, and 
hospitals but excluding traditional healers). Thus substitutions between facilities are 
automatically netted out from our results. We discuss below the implications of using a 
multinominal choice model. 
The results these two models, using the composite quality index, are quite similar (table 
4). The strongest effects are as follows: Primary education of the main female adult increases 
health usage and so does higher real consumption per capita. Distance to a public facility reduces 
usage, but the effect of distance to a private facility is insignificant. The public facilities￿ quality 
index is significantly different from zero, while not significantly different from the private 
quality effects. We experimented with adding more variables into the equation, without changing 
the findings. For example, it may be argued that quality and facility presence are likely to 
interact in the demand for health care; that is, distance and poor quality may reinforce each other. 
However, multiplicative terms for private and public facilities were found to be jointly and 
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 separately insignificant when entered into the models.
16  
Marginal effects of the key variables for these models (as for several others) are reported 
in table 5 (evaluated at the mean). The first two rows give the marginal effects for the models 
reported in table 4. Broadly speaking, they are quite similar. For example, despite significant 
sample selection terms, the specification with and without sample selection has very similar 
marginal effects.  
Using model 2 we find that having a mother who completed at least primary school 
increases health care usage about 35 percentage points. A 10 percent increase in consumption 
increases usage by almost 6 percentage points. A one kilometer closer public health facility 
increases use by 1.6 percentage points, while an increase in the quality of public facilities by a 
third (that is, one additional item in the index satisfied) increases usage about 5 percentage 
points. A similar effect applies to the quality of private facilities. The random effects formulation 
typically has somewhat higher estimates. However, in the rest of the article we are interested in 
the relative contribution of increasing usage by reducing the distance to or increasing the quality 
of health care facilities, and the relative marginal effects remain very similar across 
specifications.  
The rest of table 5 looks into these marginal effects based on tests of the robustness of 
these results. The third row reports an attempt to control for possible self-selection problems 
associated with censoring the sample to those who are ill, by estimating a bivariate probit with 
sample selection with appropriate Heckman correction. We jointly estimate a selection equation 
and the usage equation, allowing for correlation in the errors and using this information in the 
usage equation as a control for selection (Greene 1993). The key issue is to find identifying 
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 instruments for the equation explaining self-reported illness. Although a reasonable expectation 
is that those households that are poorer and have less education would have a higher incidence of 
illness, data based on the self-reporting of illness do not typically find such a pattern. This is also 
the case here, suggesting that some of the problems related to self-reporting may have to do with 
information about illness, a fact that can be exploited to find appropriate instruments. In 
particular, we run a first-stage regression explaining illness using the same variables as in the 
usage regression plus variables describing health knowledge. In the survey the most important 
female household member (usually the spouse of the head or the head) was asked to identify the 
cause of diarrhea and malaria. The instruments used were variables based on whether these 
answers were correct or not, both directly entered into the regression and interacted with 
consumption and education variables. Knowledge as an identifying instrument may not be fully 
convincing, but even so, the robustness of the findings is striking.
17 
Row 4 displays the results when visits to pharmacies are not treated as modern health care 
visits; row 5 considers a specification including health knowledge variables (as in the selection 
equation in row 3). Both models give very similar marginal effects as before.
18 A multinominal 
specification (using a multinominal logit with choices of no treatment, treatment in private facilities, 
and treatment at public facilities) did not give different results. Restricting the sample to adults and 
investigating whether the poor behave differently also revealed little difference, especially in the 
variables related to public health facilities.  
The last two rows warrant more discussion. A major potential shortcoming of this 
analysis is that quality and distance effects are measured without taking account of the fact that 
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 facilities may not have been randomly placed. In particular, planners may have located them 
according to characteristics unobserved by the researcher that are correlated with the 
determinants of health and health usage, biasing estimates on the variables of interest. To the 
extent that these unobserved characteristics are fixed, fixed effects models can deal with this 
problem. We used a fixed effects logit model on the four villages for which we have information. 
For comparison, we first gave the logit for this restricted data set. The sample is very small to 
obtain good point estimates of the various marginal effects. In general, the logit model gives 
larger marginal effects on quality and distance of public facilities, although in relative terms the 
effects are still very similar. The fixed effects regression can give some indication of the bias 
involved as a result of program placement (or indeed any other missing fixed characteristic). The 
sample becomes restricted to people who were ill in at least two of the four periods and who 
experienced a change in health usage in this period. Only 110 observations satisfy these 
conditions, and only household size, consumption, and quality of public health facilities appear 
to change in this period. Quality changed in only two of the four villages, so this is indeed a 
small sample to pick up any effects. In view of this, the results are quite interesting. We find a 
positive correlation between quality and usage, albeit not quite significant. The effect was larger 
than the effect in the simple logit on the four villages (and outside the implied 95 percent 
confidence interval by this model). This suggests that the quality effect is underestimated due to 
placement effects; that is, an unobserved effect that contributes positively to usage is negatively 
correlated with the quality indicator. For example, if the unobserved effects are linked to wealth, 
then the supply rule of facility quality may have favored poorer areas. Since we do not observe 
new facility building (and therefore change in distance) in the sample, we cannot investigate 
further the placement effects related to distance. Still, the results of the fixed effects model 
  21suggest that we may well be underestimating the contribution of quality to health usage, biasing 
the results in favor of allocating public expenditure toward reducing distance rather than 
increasing quality.  
Thus both the distance and the quality aspects of the shadow price of usage have 
significant effects on demand. It is possible to compare these effects more directly. Restricting 
the discussion to the point estimates using the full sample, the marginal effect of increasing the 
index of quality from zero to one is 15￿21 percent. A reduction in distance by one kilometer 
increases usage by 1.2￿1.7 percent. Obviously, these are only point estimates￿for example, 
taking the marginal effects using the random effects model suggests a 95 percent confidence 
interval of about 12￿31 percent for quality increases from zero to one, and a 0.8￿2.3 percent 
increase of usage by reducing distance to public facilities by one kilometer.
19 Another way of 
looking at the results is to consider the impact on usage of bringing all clinics up to the quality 
standard of ￿fully satisfactory.￿
20 The effect on usage would be considerable, with demand 
increasing 9.3 percentage points (using model 2). The same effect on demand could be achieved 
by reducing the mean distance to clinics 5.9 kilometers.
21 In the next section we compare the 
costs of increasing usage by improving quality and by reducing distance.  
IV. BUDGETARY COSTS AND THE DENSITY-QUALITY CHOICE 
The decision to build more facilities or improve the quality of existing facilities has been 
decentralized to local government in Ethiopia. Currently, about 43 percent of the health budget is 




 health care budgeting.
22 We now show how the results on usage can be combined with local 
information to yield a workable decision rule at the local level and show that it is likely to 
change budget decisions substantially.  
Recall from equation 17 that one condition for an allocation to be optimal is that the 
marginal dollar spent on improving quality must have a smaller impact on usage than the 
marginal dollar spent on increasing the number of facilities. We consider these two marginal 
effects in turn. 
The marginal effect of expenditure on quality improvement can be decomposed into two 
terms: 









      
where Eq is public expenditure on quality of provision. 
In the previous section we measured Q on the six-point scale shown in table 3 and 
estimated the second term on the right-hand side, dV/dQ. Using information at the regional level, 
it will usually be straightforward for a budget agency to estimate the first term, the cost of 
achieving a marginal quality improvement in the health facilities in a locality. Here we illustrate 
using a crude national-level approximation. We stress that our purpose is primarily illustrative: 
Information at the level where such decisions are routinely made will always be superior to these 
national-level data.  
Nationally, health costs are not available at the level of disaggregation used in table 3, 
forcing us to rely on inferences from the total cost of clinics. Even at this level of aggregation the 
data are problematic, because not all components of expenditure are channelled through the 
  23
 budget. The total cost of providing the current level of primary health care quality in the public 
sector is the total recurrent expenditure on primary health care plus off-budget recurrent 
expenditure on drugs less revenue from user charges, which is very largely in the form of 
charges for drugs. Recurrent expenditure on primary health care (that is, for health centers and 
clinics plus some allocation for health programs and management) in the 1994/5 budget was 138 
million birr (World Bank 1995). However, in 1994 most of Ethiopia￿s drug supply was provided 
off-budget by donors. Although (remarkably) there is insufficient financial information to 
provide an accurate costing of this provision, we estimate that the cost of drugs net of recovered 
costs is approximately equal to the value of gross expenditure on primary care by the 
government. Hence we estimate the total gross cost of primary care at about 276 million birr (see 
Government of Ethiopia 1997).
23 This expenditure, distributed over the 2,010 primary health 
stations, purchases the current frequency distribution of quality of primary health care (so that 
the unit cost of a facility is 137,300 birr). 
Using the six-point quality scale of table 3, which ranges from 0 to 1, the population-
weighted mean level of quality is 0.60. For purposes of illustration we assume that the cost of 
health care quality is linear in this index. Thus raising average quality from 0.6 to 0.7 would 
require an increase in the gross cost of primary care of one sixth, or 46 million birr. From the 
coefficient on quality in the random effects usage regression (model 2), this increase in quality 
would raise usage by 2.6 percent.
24 Analogously, an increase in expenditure on quality 
improvement of 10 million birr per year would increase usage about 0.6 percent.  
Making such a calculation at the national level is difficult; in any particular local 
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 situation it will be much easier. There will be a limited number of clinics, most of which will be 
of satisfactory quality, while a few (typically about a third) will have identifiable deficiencies, 
such as lack of trained staff or deficient equipment, for which the cost of rectification can 
reasonably be estimated. Hence the cost of quality improvement is not an intrinsically difficult 
number to estimate, it is simply problematic to arrive at a national average cost from national 
data.  
We next consider the effect of an increase of 10,000 birr in expenditure on the provision 
of facilities. The marginal effectiveness of such expenditure can be decomposed into three terms: 












      
where Ef is public expenditure on facility provision and N the number of facilities. 
The first of the three terms in equation 19, the cost of an additional health unit, consists 
of the annual cost of running the unit and the amortized cost of its construction. We have already 
calculated the cost of running a unit at 137,300 birr. The amortized cost of construction can be 
inferred from government estimates of the construction cost of a primary health care complex (a 
set of five rural health stations or clinics, managed by a health center, usually located in an urban 
center). The unit cost of building such a complex, as budgeted in the government￿s health plan, 
is 1.5 million birr, or 300,000 birr per health station (Ministry of Health 1995). We convert this 
into an annualized cost assuming a discount rate of 10 percent, yielding an annual cost of 30,000 
birr.
25 Hence the approximate total annual unit cost of an additional primary health facility is 
167,300 birr.  
We now turn to the second term, the relation between the number of facilities and the 
  25
 mean distance to a facility. In any particular local situation this is a simple matter: Given the 
location of existing facilities and the distribution of the population, there will be some site for a 
proposed facility that will maximize the reduction in the distance of potential users. The 
reduction in distance achieved by the proposed location is then a straightforward calculation. To 
illustrate using national data requires some simplifying approximations.  
Suppose that the allocation decision in question is to build several new facilities to 
provide coverage to a district that has previously not been served and over which the population 
is evenly distributed. The decision problem is to determine the appropriate number of facilities, 
N. The district covers an area of C square kilometers. Each facility will serve a catchment area 
Cf, and between them the facilities will serve the entire area, so that 
 
(20)         NCf = C.              
Since the total area to be served is given, any change in the number of facilities must 
have an offsetting proportionate change in the catchment area: 
(21)      dlnN + dlnCf = 0            
We approximate Cf by the circular area πr
2, where r is the radius of the catchment area. 
In this case the mean distance of users to the facility, D, is determined as 2r/3. The term dD/dN 





























= =   
From equation 21, the first term on the right-hand side of equation 22 is minus unity, 
while the second term is 0.5. Hence a 1 percent increase in the number of facilities reduces the 
  26mean distance to a facility by 0.5 percent.
26  
  The third term in equation 19 was estimated in the usage regression. According to the 
random effects probit, a reduction in the mean distance to a facility of 0.1 kilometer increases 
usage by 0.12 percent . Given the current mean distance to a facility, this is a reduction of about 
1.7 percent. Such a reduction in the mean distance would require an increase in the density of 
facilities of 3.5 percent (that is, 1.017
2￿1). 
The cost of a 3.5 percent increase in the number of facilities is 12 million birr a year. 
Hence an increase in expenditure on the provision of facilities of 10 million birr would increase 
usage about 0.1 percent. 
Bringing the analysis together, an increase in expenditure of 10 million birr would raise 
usage about 0.6 percent if spent on quality improvement but only about 0.1 percent if spent on 
more facilities. Thus given the current allocation of the budget, quality improvement appears to 
be more effective in increasing usage than building additional facilities.
27 Yet we know from 
equation 17 that this cannot be optimal. Since improving health outcomes rather than usage is the 
policy objective, once expenditure is efficiently allocated a marginal increase in spending on 
quality improvement will increase usage by less than if the money were spent on more facilities. 
Hence nationally the current budget allocation appears to be too heavily skewed toward 
provision of facilities. We have stressed that the national level data are primarily illustrative. The 
conclusion that the budget is currently misallocated indeed rests on heroic assumptions. 
Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that sizable gains might be achieved in the efficiency of 
health expenditure if local budget decisions applied the decision rule set out above. The results 
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suggest the limits of increasing health care usage through changes in the health budget. Both 
expenditure reallocation and expenditure increases appear to have relatively modest effects on 
usage. Maternal education and household income both affect usage quite substantially. Hence 
education and rural development policies be may even more important for health usage 
objectives than health care policy itself. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article provides a decision rule for choosing between the quantity and the quality of health 
care provision that could be applied at the local level. Using national data, we show that current 
priorities are unlikely to be cost effective. Based on analysis of a large-sample rural household 
survey, we find that household usage of health facilities is sensitive to the quality of health care 
as well as to the distance to the nearest public facility. Given the current budget allocation, it 
appears to be considerably less costly to increase usage by improving quality than by bringing 
facilities closer to people. Health outcomes rather than usage are the ultimate concern of policy, 
and quality improvement directly improves both health outcomes and usage. In an efficient 
budget allocation, expenditure on building facilities would be reduced to the point at which its 
effect on usage was greater than that of expenditure on quality improvement. 
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NOTES 
1 Health outcome data, in particular adult nutrition and functioning data, are also 
available but were not included in the analysis. In principle, the links among distance, quality of 
health services, and outcomes can be fruitfully analyzed (examples are in Thomas, Lavy, and 
Strauss 1996 and Lavy and others 1996). However, strong seasonality in nutritional outcomes 
and the importance of controlling for health endowments make this analysis beyond the scope of 
this article. For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of adult nutrition in Ethiopia and the link 
with illness and health care, see Dercon and Krishnan (2000). 
2 The World Health Report (WHO 2000) estimates male under-five mortality rates at 100 
per thousand for Kenya, 145 for Cote d￿Ivoire, and 188 for Ethiopia, with adult mortality rates 
also higher in Ethiopia. In 1994 life expectancy in Ethiopia was estimated to be only about 43 
years for men￿well below the African average of 52 years. 
3 Nevertheless, in the econometric model, the response to increased spending on public 
services and the impact on usage of private health providers will have to be taken into account 
(Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 1997).  
5 The alternative￿incorporating the likely effects of health on future income￿would 
require an explicitly dynamic model. For an extensive survey on modeling the demand for health 
care, see Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) and Strauss and Thomas (1995). 
6 The implications of the government maximizing utility rather than health outcomes are 
more complicated to analyze. Under additional assumptions, the conditions derived in the main 
part of the article will also guarantee that utility is maximized. 
9 The data￿the most recent official statistics available￿are from the sector investment   30
office of the Ethiopian government and are based on a sample survey of 57 government health 
stations and centers in rural areas in 1995. 
10 Alderman and Lavy (1996) and Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett (1997) discuss the 
problems with defining appropriate quality measures. Measures of infrastructure, drugs, and staff 
are commonly used. 
11 As in other surveys, illness episodes are biased as a result of self-reporting. For 
example, there was very little difference between rich and poor households in the incidence of 
reported illness. Educated parents reported more illness of their children. The results appear 
consistent with evidence from the Welfare Monitoring Survey collected in 1995/96 by the 
Central Statistical Authority. That survey is a nationally representative survey covering 7,000 
rural and 4,000 urban households in 894 enumeration areas. It found that 19.4 percent of 
respondents in rural areas reported having been ill during the two months before the survey and 
that about 49 percent of them reported having sought treatment. 
12 The Ministry of Health and many studies focusing on health facility usage consider 
visits to pharmacies not as visits to ￿modern facilities￿ but rather as forms of self-treatment, 
since in principle, diagnosis and treatment should be restricted to health clinics, facilities, or 
trained health workers. In the survey, households clearly did not make this distinction. In the 
econometric analysis, the implication of using a treatment definition including or excluding 
pharmacies is explored. 
13 Data exclude traditional treatment. Private facilities include NGOs, which account for 
about 15 percent of visits to private facilities in our sample.  
14 Data from the Welfare Monitoring System appear to suggest an even larger share of the 
private sector, with only 41.2 percent of those seeking treatment visiting a public facility in rural   31
areas.  
15 The mean distance to the nearest center￿about 7￿8 kilometers￿is quite close to the 
average distances reported in the Welfare Monitoring System data in a nationally representative 
rural sample. The sample largely excludes pastoral and other lowland areas, which would have 
increased distance substantially. This mean distance is similar to the distance to public facilities 
in Kenya (8 kilometers in the data used in Mwabu, Ainsworth, and Nyametes 1993) and in 
Ghana (8.3 kilometers in the data used by Lavy and Germain 1994).  
16 Although the sample of health facilities is small, these measures are very close to the 
estimates from the 1995 survey by the sectoral investment office of the government of Ethiopia, 
which found that a quarter of public health stations and centers had no refrigerator and about half 
the public primary facilities lacked more than a quarter of essential drugs. 
17 An alternative would have been to include only data on public and private health 
facilities that are not pharmacies, but this distinction was not made during data collection. 
Qualitatively, results on the key variables of interest are unchanged when excluding this dummy, 
although the fit is not as good. 
18 Testing the joint restriction of equality of the coefficients on the three quality 
indicators for the public facilities revealed that equality could not be rejected at 1 percent. 
Individually, we typically found that the presence of a nurse in a public facility had no effect on 
usage, while inputs and equipment (drugs and refrigerators) had strong significant effects. 
19 For example, adding public and private quality times distance terms in model 2 gave z-
values of 0.57 and -0.82 and χ
2(2)=1.43 for their joint significance in the model (that is, no 
significant effects). 
20 As ever in selection models, it could be argued that illness knowledge will also   32
contribute to whether an ill person seeks treatment, making the usage model misspecified (if left 
out) or the selection equation identified only by distributional characteristics (if included in the 
usage equation). This problem cannot be solved. Furthermore, knowledge may be a function of 
past usage. If it is, this variable measures past usage. The high significance is therefore not 
surprising, and the variable is not very convincing as an identifying instrument.  
21 The specification displayed in row 5 suggests that controlling for wealth, education, 
and facility characteristics, the return to health knowledge is high: Knowing the cause of 
diarrhea increases modern health usage 5 percent, while knowing the cause of malaria increases 
modern health usage 4 percent. 
22 It is possible to compare these results with Ghana. Lavy and Germain (1994) show that 
the net increase in use of (public and private) health facilities from bringing drugs, infrastructure, 
and service to ￿optimal￿ levels in public facilities was equal to 3 percentage points. Since quality 
appears to be substantially lower in the Ethiopian public health service, the effects appear 
comparable. Similarly, the effect of halving the distance to the nearest public health facility 
increased the usage of health facilities by 5 percentage points at the mean. In Ethiopia the effect 
of halving distance would be equivalent to about 4.1 percentage point. 
23 We also looked at the effects for different quality items, by introducing them in the 
regressions rather than the composite index. We found that the move to full drug availability 
would increase usage 3.6 percent, and installing and repairing refrigerators in all public facilities 
would increase usage about 6.6 percent. 
24 Other regressions give very similar relative effects. Using the extreme point estimates 
of marginal effects implied by table 5 for the full sample, we found that increasing demand by 
bringing all public facilities up to full basic quality could also be obtained by reducing distance   33
3.8￿7.7 kilometers. The values implied by the confidence interval would suggest 2.2￿16.9 
kilometers. These values can be used to investigate the robustness of the results in the next 
section.  
25 Figures are for 1997￿99, before actual capital expenditures (World Bank 2000). 
26 The data indicate that this is likely to be an overestimate. One report estimates the total 
value of drugs supplied in Ethiopia at about 360 million birr (Mengesha 1996). Using the right-
hand side data we find per capita expenditure on drugs of about 8 birr a year, equivalent to about 
400 million birr a year￿somewhat higher than Mengesha￿s estimate. Very few people are 
exempt from charges for drugs and treatment in rural Ethiopia: Data from the right-hand side 
indicate exemption rates at health stations and centers of less than 10 percent. Unpublished data 
from the sectoral investment office at the Ministry of Health suggest somewhat higher 
exemptions rates, but even those data show that just 12￿27 percent of patients were exempt. At 
the current level of quality at health facilities, households are often dependent on private 
pharmacies for drugs. Taken together, this would support the view that off-budget financing of 
drugs is lower in net terms than the estimate used in the evaluation￿ that is, we overestimate the 
cost of quality. 
27 Below we discuss the sensitivity of the results to using different estimates. 
28 The Ministry of Economic Development and Planning estimates the cost of building 
five health stations and a health center at almost 3.4 million birr. It uses much lower depreciation 
rates for buildings, so that the annualized cost is about 45,000 birr per health station. Building 
health stations without a supporting health center would be cheaper, at an annualized cost of 
about 20,000 birr.  
29 To see this more intuitively, imagine the proposed facilities arranged on a grid pattern.   34
To halve the average distance to a clinic, it is necessary to reduce the scale of the existing grid 
by half. This implies reducing the catchment area of each facility by a factor of four. Hence a 
halving of distance requires a quadrupling of the number of facilities. A similar result holds for 
the hexagonal catchment areas, which Losch (1954) shows to be optimal. Were the population 
and clinics strung out along a single line of road like beads on a string, the mean distance could 
be halved simply by doubling the number of clinics. However, about half of the rural population 
is living in villages that are not even connected by all-weather roads. 
31 The point that spending on quality appears more effective than spending on reducing 
distance remains valid if any of the alternative estimates discussed in section III is used. For 
example, using any combination of the other point estimates for the marginal effects, the impact 
from spending on quality is always at least twice as large as the impact from distance reduction. 
The 95 percent intervals of the point estimates of the models used do not change the conclusion, 
although the difference becomes smaller. For example, the intervals of the marginal effects based 
on the random effects model (model 2) suggest that even the lowest marginal effect from quality 
and the highest marginal impact from density would imply that increasing usage by increasing 
density is still 50 percent more expensive than increasing usage by improving quality.    35
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No  treatment  54.6 52.0 51.7 49.8 52.0
Nearest  clinic  21.6 18.9 20.4 19.7 20.1
Nearest  hospital  4.7 8.6 6.5 9.5 7.4
Hospital/clinic (not nearest)  4.8  6.1  6.3 6.7  6.0
Home of health worker  5.0  4.1  5.0 6.4  5.1
Pharmacy  8.4 9.2 8.5 6.1 8.0
Traditional  healer  1.0 1.2 1.7 1.9 1.4
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, rounds 1￿4. 
 
 














Public 62.7 63.2 57.2  63.7  61.8
Private 37.3 36.8 42.8  36.3  38.2
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, rounds 1￿4. 
 
 
Table 3. Frequency Distribution of Public and Private Facilities, by Level of Quality 
(percent) 
  1994
  Panel 1994￿97  
Item Public  Private  Public  94 Public 97  Private 94  Private 97
 
Equipment, inputs, and staff  31 50 0 21  50  50 
Equipment and inputs only  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Equipment and staff only  5 0 0 0  0  0 
Inputs and staff only  16 0 36 36  0  0 
Equipment only  16 3 21 29  0  0 
Inputs only  12 0 29 0  0  0 
Staff only  11 0 0 0  0  0 
None 10 47 14 14  50  50 
Note: Panel data for 1994￿97 are based on four villages. In villages in which the only source of primary health care 
was a pharmacy (drug vendor), data refer to pharmacies. None of the pharmacies had a regular supply of antibiotics, 
a working refrigerator, or a regularly present, qualified staff (health worker, nurse, or doctor). Private facilities in the 
panel villages experienced no change in the quality indicators, so only one column is reported.  
Source: 1994 and 1997 community-level surveys linked to the Ethiopian Rural Household survey. 
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Table 4. Regression Results Explaining Health Care Usage, 1994￿97  
(dependent variable = consulted modern facility when ill) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Probit (pooled cross-section)  Random effects probit model 
(unbalanced panel 1994/97) 
Item Coefficient  Probability  >  |z| Coefficient  Probability > |z|
Constant   -1.184  0.000
  -1.642 0.000 
Age in months/1,000   0.546  0.263  0.763  0.096 
Age squared/100,000   -0.767  0.107  -1.040  0.045 
Sex    0.063 0.364 0.108 0.158 
Sex of head of household   0.108  0.195  0.172  0.099 
Age of head of household   -0.002  0.519  -0.003  0.327 
Mother completed primary school  0.703  0.068  1.016  0.010 
Household size   0.012  0.506  0.016  0.193 
Log consumption per capita (real)  0.122  0.000  0.140  0.005 
Kilometers to nearest public health 
care facility 
-0.032 0.008  -0.039 0.000 
Quality index public  0.383  0.069  0.539  0.000 
Kilometers to nearest private 
health care facility 
-0.001 0.944  -0.001 0.822 
Quality index private  0.451  0.059  0.699  0.058 
Dummy public pharmacy  0.581  0.003  0.873  0.011 
Sample selection      
Joint significance   78.73  0.000  81.06  0.000 
Sample size  2,317  2,317 (1,834 groups) 
Note: Errors corrected for cluster effects. 
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, rounds 1￿4. 
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